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+-----------------------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber's Note: | | | | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | Mathematical equations and variables are marked with | | [Math:] to reduce confusion between underscores used for | | italics and underscores used to indicate subscripts. | | Subscripts are indicated with underscores, with the | | subscripted character marked with {}'s, i.e.: x_{t} | | | | Greek letters have been transliterated and marked with | | []'s, i.e.: [alpha] | | | | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+
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BERTRAND RUSSELL
MYSTICISM AND LOGIC
AND OTHER ESSAYS
_LONDON_ GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET
MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER ESSAYS
BY BERTRAND RUSSELL
_The ABC of Relativity_ _The Analysis of Matter_ _Human Society in Ethics and Politics_ _The Impact of Science on Society_ _New Hopes for a Changing World_ _Authority and the Individual_ _Human Knowledge_ _History of Western Philosophy_ _The Principles of Mathematics_ _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy_ _The Analysis of Mind_ _Our Knowledge of the External World_ _An Outline of Philosophy_ _The Philosophy of Leibniz_ _An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth_ _Logic and Knowledge_ _The Problems of Philosophy_ _Principia Mathematica_
_Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare_ _Why I am Not a Christian_ _Portraits from Memory_ _My Philosophical Development_ _Unpopular Essays_ _Power_ _In Praise of Idleness_ _The Conquest of Happiness_ _Sceptical Essays_ _The Scientific Outlook_ _Marriage and Morals_ _Education and the Social Order_ _On Education_
_Freedom and Organization_ _Principles of Social Reconstruction_ _Roads to Freedom_ _Practice and Theory of Bolshevism_
_Satan in The Suburbs_ _Nightmares of Eminent Persons_
_First published as "Philosophical Essays"_ _October 1910_ _Second Edition as "Mysticism and Logic"_ _December 1917_ _Third Impression_ _April 1918_ _Fourth Impression_ _February 1919_ _Fifth Impression_ _October 1921_ _Sixth Impression_ _August 1925_ _Seventh Impression_ _January 1932_ _Eighth Impression_ _1949_ _Ninth Impression_ _1950_ _Tenth Impression_ _1951_ _Eleventh Impression_ _1959_
_This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no portion may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiry should be made to the publisher._
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN _by Taylor Garnett Evans & Co. Ltd., Watford, Herts._
The following essays have been written and published at various times, and my thanks are due to the previous publishers for the permission to reprint them.
The essay on "Mysticism and Logic" appeared in the _Hibbert Journal_ for July, 1914. "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education" appeared in two numbers of _The New Statesman_, May 24 and 31, 1913. "The Free Man's Worship" and "The Study of Mathematics" were included in a former collection (now out of print), _Philosophical Essays_, also published by Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. Both were written in 1902; the first appeared originally in the _Independent Review_ for 1903, the second in the _New Quarterly_, November, 1907. In theoretical Ethics, the position advocated in "The Free Man's Worship" is not quite identical with that which I hold now: I feel less convinced than I did then of the objectivity of good and evil. But the general attitude towards life which is suggested in that essay still seems to me, in the main, the one which must be adopted in times of stress and difficulty by those who have no dogmatic religious beliefs, if inward defeat is to be avoided.
The essay on "Mathematics and the Metaphysicians" was written in 1901, and appeared in an American magazine, _The International Monthly_, under the title "Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mathematics." Some points in this essay require modification in view of later work. These are indicated in footnotes. Its tone is partly explained by the fact that the editor begged me to make the article "as romantic as possible."
All the above essays are entirely popular, but those that follow are somewhat more technical. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" was the Herbert Spencer lecture at Oxford in 1914, and was published by the Clarendon Press, which has kindly allowed me to include it in this collection. "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" was an address to the Manchester Philosophical Society, early in 1915, and was published in the _Monist_ in July of that year. The essay on "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics" was written in January, 1914, and first appeared in No. 4 of that year's volume of _Scientia_, an International Review of Scientific Synthesis, edited by M. Eugenio Rignano, published monthly by Messrs. Williams and Norgate, London, Nicola Zanichelli, Bologna, and Félix Alcan, Paris. The essay "On the Notion of Cause" was the presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in November, 1912, and was published in their _Proceedings_ for 1912-13. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" was also a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, and published in their _Proceedings_ for 1910-11.
LONDON, _September, 1917_
I. _Mysticism and Logic_ 1
II. _The Place of Science in a Liberal Education_ 33
III. _A Free Man's Worship_ 46
IV. _The Study of Mathematics_ 58
V. _Mathematics and the Metaphysicians_ 74
VI. _On Scientific Method in Philosophy_ 97
VII. _The Ultimate Constituents of Matter_ 125
VIII. _The Relation of Sense-data to Physics_ 145
IX. _On the Notion of Cause_ 180
X. _Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description_ 209
MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER ESSAYS
Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, others through the other alone: in Hume, for example, the scientific impulse reigns quite unchecked, while in Blake a strong hostility to science co-exists with profound mystic insight. But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonise the two was what made their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.
Before attempting an explicit characterisation of the scientific and the mystical impulses, I will illustrate them by examples from two philosophers whose greatness lies in the very intimate blending which they achieved. The two philosophers I mean are Heraclitus and Plato.
Heraclitus, as every one knows, was a believer in universal flux: time builds and destroys all things. From the few fragments that remain, it is not easy to discover how he arrived at his opinions, but there are some sayings that strongly suggest scientific observation as the source.
"The things that can be seen, heard, and learned," he says, "are what I prize the most." This is the language of the empiricist, to whom observation is the sole guarantee of truth. "The sun is new every day," is another fragment; and this opinion, in spite of its paradoxical character, is obviously inspired by scientific reflection, and no doubt seemed to him to obviate the difficulty of understanding how the sun can work its way underground from west to east during the night. Actual observation must also have suggested to him his central doctrine, that Fire is the one permanent substance, of which all visible things are passing phases. In combustion we see things change utterly, while their flame and heat rise up into the air and vanish.
"This world, which is the same for all," he says, "no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out."
"The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind."
This theory, though no longer one which science can accept, is nevertheless scientific in spirit. Science, too, might have inspired the famous saying to which Plato alludes: "You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you." But we find also another statement among the extant fragments: "We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not."
The comparison of this statement, which is mystical, with the one quoted by Plato, which is scientific, shows how intimately the two tendencies are blended in the system of Heraclitus. Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe; and this kind of feeling leads Heraclitus, on the basis of his science, to strangely poignant sayings concerning life and the world, such as:
"Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child's."
It is poetic imagination, not science, which presents Time as despotic lord of the world, with all the irresponsible frivolity of a child. It is mysticism, too, which leads Heraclitus to assert the identity of opposites: "Good and ill are one," he says; and again: "To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right."
Much of mysticism underlies the ethics of Heraclitus. It is true that a scientific determinism alone might have inspired the statement: "Man's character is his fate"; but only a mystic would have said:
"Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows"; and again:
"It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul"; and again:
"Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things."[1]
Examples might be multiplied, but those that have been given are enough to show the character of the man: the facts of science, as they appeared to him, fed the flame in his soul, and in its light he saw into the depths of the world by the reflection of his own dancing swiftly penetrating fire. In such a nature we see the true union of the mystic and the man of science--the highest eminence, as I think, that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought.
In Plato, the same twofold impulse exists, though the mystic impulse is distinctly the stronger of the two, and secures ultimate victory whenever the conflict is sharp. His description of the cave is the classical statement of belief in a knowledge and reality truer and more real than that of the senses:
"Imagine[2] a number of men living in an underground cavernous chamber, with an entrance open to the light, extending along the entire length of the cavern, in which they have been confined, from their childhood, with their legs and necks so shackled that they are obliged to sit still and look straight forwards, because their chains render it impossible for them to turn their heads round: and imagine a bright fire burning some way off, above and behind them, and an elevated roadway passing between the fire and the prisoners, with a low wall built along it, like the screens which conjurors put up in front of their audience, and above which they exhibit their wonders.
Also figure to yourself a number of persons walking behind this wall, and carrying with them statues of men, and images of other animals, wrought in wood and stone and all kinds of materials, together with various other articles, which overtop the wall; and, as you might expect, let some of the passers-by be talking, and others silent.
You are describing a strange scene, and strange prisoners.
They resemble us, I replied.
Now consider what would happen if the course of nature brought them a release from their fetters, and a remedy for their foolishness, in the following manner. Let us suppose that one of them has been released, and compelled suddenly to stand up, and turn his neck round and walk with open eyes towards the light; and let us suppose that he goes through all these actions with pain, and that the dazzling splendour renders him incapable of discerning those objects of which he used formerly to see the shadows. What answer should you expect him to make, if some one were to tell him that in those days he was watching foolish phantoms, but that now he is somewhat nearer to reality, and is turned towards things more real, and sees more correctly; above all, if he were to point out to him the several objects that are passing by, and question him, and compel him to answer what they are? Should you not expect him to be puzzled, and to regard his old visions as truer than the objects now forced upon his notice?