Status Games
zero-sum games · status competition
Competition for relative position rather than absolute outcome. Because position is defined by rank, the supply is fixed however much the underlying good increases — Hirsch (1976) called these positional goods, and growth cannot satisfy demand for them.
In practice
A firm raises everyone's title to retain people. Retention improves for two quarters and then returns, because what was scarce was not the word but the distance between it and the next one, and that distance was just removed.
The common mistake
Trying to satisfy a positional demand with an absolute supply. More of the good does not help when the good is rank; the only moves that work are changing which hierarchy someone is in, or changing what the hierarchy is scored on.
Some goods are wanted for what they are and some for where they place you. The second kind behaves differently in every respect that matters, and the difference is not a matter of degree.
Positional goods
Thorstein Veblen (1899) described consumption undertaken to display standing rather than to be used, and coined conspicuous consumption for it. Fred Hirsch (1976) gave the structural account: positional goods are those whose value depends on others not having themHirsch, F. (1976). Social Limits to Growth. Harvard University Press. Hirsch's argument is that as material scarcity eases, competition shifts to goods that are scarce by construction — rank, exclusivity, access. Economic growth cannot relieve this scarcity, because the supply is fixed by definition, so growth raises effort without raising satisfaction.. A view, a front-row seat, the top of a class, the senior title. Supply is fixed by definition, so growth cannot relieve the scarcity, and the effort spent competing is socially wasted even when privately rational. Robert Frank (1985) added the finding that most people evaluate their position against a local reference group rather than a global one — which is why being well paid inside a poorly paid firm can feel better than the reverse.
Why the games are hard to leave
René Girard (1961, 1972) supplies the mechanism that makes status self-sustaining. Desire is mimetic: we want things because others want them, so the model is also the rivalGirard, R. (1961). Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque; (1972). La Violence et le sacré. Girard's triangular structure — subject, model, object — makes the object secondary. Because the model is imitated and also stands in the way, imitation and rivalry are the same movement, and conflict intensifies as the parties become more alike., and the closer two parties are the more intense the rivalry. This predicts the observed pattern that status competition is fiercest among near-equals rather than across large gaps, and that the object being competed for tends to matter less over time than the competition itself.
The objections
The explanation is available for everything, which is the standard charge against Girard and against status accounts generally. Any behaviour can be redescribed as status-seeking after the fact, and the redescription is unfalsifiable and faintly flattering to whoever makes it, since the analyst is implicitly outside the game. A status account earns its keep only where it predicts something an absolute-goods account does not — that adding supply will not help, for instance, which is checkable.
The second objection is that positional competition is not merely waste. Rank is a cheap and reasonably informative signal where quality is hard to observe directly, and tournaments produce effort that would not otherwise be produced. Hirsch's conclusion that the competition is socially wasteful holds for the consumption case and much less clearly for the productive one.
What it rules out
It rules out raising the absolute level to resolve a positional dispute — the general increase preserves every rank. It rules out reading satisfaction from compensation alone, since the comparison set does most of the work. And it rules out any promise that everyone can be above average, which is the implicit offer in most retention schemes.
It does not rule out caring about status. Rank carries real information and real consequences. What it rules out is expecting a positional appetite to be satisfied by an absolute supply, and the practical moves that remain are changing the hierarchy you are in or changing what it scores.
Sources
Frank, R. H. (1985). Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. Oxford University Press. · Girard, R. (1961). Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque. Grasset. · Girard, R. (1972). La Violence et le sacré. Grasset. · Hirsch, F. (1976). Social Limits to Growth. Harvard University Press. · Veblen, T. (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class. Macmillan.
Concept web
Open the full webQuestions
What is a status game?
Competition for relative position rather than absolute outcome. Because position is rank, the supply is fixed however much the underlying good increases, so the competition cannot be resolved by giving everyone more.
What are positional goods?
Goods whose value depends on others not having them — a view, a front-row seat, a senior title. Hirsch (1976) argued economic growth cannot relieve their scarcity, because supply is fixed by definition, so growth raises effort without raising satisfaction.
Why is status competition fiercest among similar people?
Girard (1961, 1972) argued desire is mimetic: we want what others want, so the person imitated is also the rival. Imitation and rivalry are the same movement, and conflict intensifies as the parties become more alike.
What is wrong with explaining behaviour by status?
It is available for everything and therefore unfalsifiable, and it flatters the analyst, who is implicitly outside the game. A status account earns its keep only where it predicts something an absolute-goods account does not — such as that adding supply will not help.