Knowledge is the state of holding a belief that is both true and held for the right kind of reason. Distinguishing it from lucky true belief is the founding problem of epistemology.

Justified true belief

The traditional analysis sets three conditions. You know that P when P is true, you believe P, and you are justified in believing P. Each condition does work. Drop truth and you have confident error. Drop belief and you have information you do not hold. Drop justification and a correct guess would count.

In 1963 Edmund Gettier showed the three conditions can all hold while knowledge is absent. Suppose you look at a stopped clock at exactly the moment it happens to show the right time. Your belief is true, and you are justified in trusting a clock, yet you do not know. The justification and the truth are joined by accident. Sixty years of proposed fourth conditions have produced no consensus.

Kinds of knowing

Philosophers separate knowing that something is the case from knowing how to do something. Riding a bicycle is a competence rather than a stock of propositions, and describing it completely does not confer it. A third kind, knowledge by acquaintance, covers direct familiarity with a person or a color.

The Greeks marked a related distinction between episteme, secure and explanatory knowledge, and doxa, opinion that may happen to be right. Plato used it to argue that opinion is unstable until it is tied down by an account of why it is true.

Where it comes from

Empiricism traces all contentful knowledge to experience; rationalism holds that reason reaches some truths on its own; Kant argued that experience provides content while the mind provides structure. Skepticism presses on all three by asking what rules out systematic error.